There's also a memory leak fixed. ok stsp@

The session process opened an object as part of a sanity check and simply closed it again. Opening an object involves decompression and combination of deltas. Add a new interface which checks whether an object ID exists without such overhead and call it from gotd.

We need to free the matched object id queue on each pack index iteration--not only when the objects/pack dir modification time has changed--otherwise the ids are leaked when we reinitialise the queue in got_packidx_match_id_str_prefix(). tweaked by + ok op@

This should prevent a use-after-free crash I observed in gotwebd. ok op@

Fix a regression in db82695e31945b3ce001a5fb69674c3638622368 where the fetch_all_branches configuration setting from got.conf was dropped and always defaulted to "no". Add corresponding regression test. ok stsp

Fixes a crash regression introduced when fetch/send were made to close the work tree earlier.

If the child has exited for some reason then we won't be able to send a stop message on the pipe. Ignore such errors while we are tearing a repository data structure down. The error should be harmless but can trip up gotwebd when cycling repositories out of its repo cache: gotwebd[29683]: gotweb_render_index: got-portable.git: unexpected end of file

Rather than assume all dependencies are required for all programs, split them out. This will make packaging easier, as well as splitting the code to use subprojects. Note that due to the use of config.h semantics, in most cases the got_compat.h header file is now at the top of the .c file it is included in, so that it can handle the system header inclusion properly.

and use it to avoid hardcoding the digest type in a few places. ok stsp@

Simply the SHA detection by not predicating on libcrypto, but instead checking individual header files.

Remove sha1.h as this is found portably across systems.

it abstracts over the hash type and ensures that object ids are zero'ed before their sha1 digest is written. Needed by the incoming sha256 support. ok stsp@

It will soon grow functions to deal with sha256 too. stsp@ agrees.

In preparation for wide sha256 support; stsp@ agrees. Change done mechanically with find . -iname \*.[cy] -exec sam {} + X ,x/<sha1\.h>/i/\n#include <sha2.h>

reported by Lucas on IRC, who sent a patch which this commit was based on ok jamsek

Most extension allow only for a boolean value so the current behaviour of just sending the extension with a trueish value is fine. However, some extensions that we could eventually support (like "objectformat") have a string value. This is a preparatory step towards that. ok stsp@

got_repo_get_gitconfig_extensions is only used in gotadmin to check if the preciousObjects extension is active; let's replace it with a function that just checks whether a certain extension is active. It simplifies future changes to the extensions handling. ok stsp@

Accept flag parameter to optionally specify which pointers to free. This saves callers looping through the list to free pointers. ok + fix stsp@

ok op@

Convert from st.m_time (second-precision time_t) to st.m_tim (struct timespec). To compensate for the potential case where a filesystem provides resolution in seconds only, always read the directory if no pack files are known to exist. Otherwise, there is a race condition when gotd repo_write creates a new pack and a request arrives for repo_read shortly after. Caught by a regression test for gotd on empty repositories. Test failure pointed out by Mikhail. ok op@

ok op@

It's only a preparatory step, as checking whether a size_t is less than SIZE_MAX is moot. In a follow-up commit, however, the `filesize' field of the struct got_pack will become off_t and these checks will kick in. This also makes consistent how we guard mmap(2) against empty files. ok and improvements stsp@

This is an initial barebones implementation which provides the absolute minimum of functionality required to serve got(1) and git(1) clients. Basic fetch/send functionality has been tested and seems to work here, but this server is not yet expected to be stable. More testing is welcome. See the man pages for setup instructions. The current design uses one reader and one writer process per repository, which will have to be extended to N readers and N writers in the future. At startup, each process will chroot(2) into its assigned repository. This works because gotd(8) can only be started as root, and will then fork+exec, chroot, and privdrop. At present the parent process runs with the following pledge(2) promises: "stdio rpath wpath cpath proc getpw sendfd recvfd fattr flock unix unveil" The parent is the only process able to modify the repository in a way that becomes visible to Git clients. The parent uses unveil(2) to restrict its view of the filesystem to /tmp and the repositories listed in the configuration file gotd.conf(5). Per-repository chroot(2) processes use "stdio rpath sendfd recvfd". The writer defers to the parent for modifying references in the repository to point at newly uploaded commits. The reader is fine without such help, because Git repositories can be read without having to create any lock-files. gotd(8) requires a dedicated user ID, which should own repositories on the filesystem, and a separate secondary group, which should not have filesystem-level repository access, and must be allowed access to the gotd(8) socket. To obtain Git repository access, users must be members of this secondary group, and must have their login shell set to gotsh(1). gotsh(1) connects to the gotd(8) socket and speaks Git-protocol towards the client on the other end of the SSH connection. gotsh(1) is not an interactive command shell. At present, authenticated clients are granted read/write access to all repositories and all references (except for the "refs/got/" and the "refs/remotes/" namespaces, which are already being protected from modification). While complicated access control mechanism are not a design goal, making it possible to safely offer anonymous Git repository access over ssh(1) is on the road map.